Report ; Between Accusation and Denial

A Human Rights Report on Allegations of Chemical Weapons Use in Sudan

Proceedings of the July 9, 2026 Session — Legal Developments, Consequences, Accountability, and Verification Pathways

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Executive Report: Allegations of Chemical Weapons Use in Sudan

Document Title: Between Accusation and Denial: A Human Rights Report on Allegations of Chemical Weapons Use in Sudan

Key Event: 112th Session of the OPCW Executive Council (July 7–10, 2026 | Statement on July 9, 2026)

Executive Summary

This report analyzes the diplomatic, legal, and human rights developments surrounding allegations that the Government of Sudan used chemical weapons during the ongoing armed conflict in 2024. The issue reached a critical juncture during the 112th session of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in July 2026.

The situation is currently defined by two directly opposing narratives:

1. The U.S. Accusation: A formal national technical assessment presented on July 9, 2026, claiming Sudan used chemical weapons in 2024 and remains non-compliant with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), demanding full disclosure and unrestricted international access.
2. The Sudanese Denial: Document EC-112/NAT.15 (circulated July 6, 2026), presenting preliminary findings from Sudan’s National Technical Committee, which reported finding no technical or material evidence supporting the claims, while acknowledging ongoing investigations.

Core Finding: Up to the reporting date (July 17, 2026), no independent, official technical finding or decision has been issued by the OPCW Technical Secretariat regarding Sudan.

Chronology of Key Events

Comparative Analysis of Opposing Positions

                  ┌───────────────────────────────────────────┐
                  │ 112th OPCW Executive Council (July 2026)  │
                  └─────────────────────┬─────────────────────┘
                                        │
           ┌────────────────────────────┴────────────────────────────┐
           ▼                                                         ▼
┌───────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────────────────────┐
│           UNITED STATES               │ │                 SUDAN                 │
│      (Official Statement)             │ │       (Document EC-112/NAT.15)        │
├───────────────────────────────────────┤ ├───────────────────────────────────────┤
│ • Asserts Sudan used CW in 2024.      │ │ • National Committee investigated.    │
│ • Demands full CWC declaration.       │ │ • No evidence found in examined scope.│
│ • Rejects national investigation      │ │ • Notes security & logistical delays. │
│   as substitute for OPCW access.      │ │ • Emphasizes findings are preliminary.│
│ • Applied 2nd round U.S. sanctions.   │ │ • Lacks independent lab verification. │
└───────────────────┬───────────────────┘ └───────────────────┬───────────────────┘
                    │                                         │
                    └────────────────────┬────────────────────┘
                                         ▼
                  ┌───────────────────────────────────────────┐
                  │          CURRENT LEGAL STATUS             │
                  ├───────────────────────────────────────────┤
                  │ • No OPCW Technical Secretariat finding.  │
                  │ • No Executive Council decision issued.   │
                  │ • No formal Article IX Challenge launched.│
                  └───────────────────────────────────────────┘

1. The United States Position

• Core Claim: National technical assessments determined the Sudanese government used chemical weapons in 2024 and remained non-compliant through 2025.
• Key Demands: Complete and precise declaration of all relevant facilities/materials to the OPCW; immediate, unrestricted field access for OPCW inspectors.
• Stance on Internal Review: Rejects the Sudanese National Committee as an acceptable substitute for independent, international CWC verification.
• Enforcement: Enforced a second round of national sanctions and politically challenged Sudan’s standing on the Executive Council.
• Technical Gap: The U.S. has not publicly released the underlying technical data (samples, chain of custody, lab results, or exact site coordinates).

2. The Sudanese National Position

• Core Claim: Field visits, witness interviews, record reviews, and site inspections yielded no material or documentary evidence supporting chemical weapons use.
• Qualifications: Acknowledged the report represents preliminary findings, citing severe security, logistical, and information-access challenges due to the ongoing conflict.
• Technical Gap: Did not include independent accredited laboratory results, detailed sample data, or externally verifiable chains of custody.

Key Findings

1. Absence of OPCW Technical Findings: The Technical Secretariat of the OPCW has not published an independent investigation or technical report concerning the Sudan allegations.
2. National Statements vs. Institutional Decisions: Neither the U.S. accusation nor the Sudanese denial constitutes an official OPCW decision. The Executive Council took no formal measures or collective actions regarding Sudan during the 112th session (distinguishing it from decisions taken regarding other states, such as Syria).
3. Nature of Sanctions: The sanctions against Sudan are unilateral U.S. national measures, not OPCW-mandated sanctions.
4. Limits of National Investigations: Internal investigations by state bodies facing allegations cannot substitute for international verification under the CWC framework.
5. Human Rights Imperative: Unverified chemical weapons allegations risk politicization while leaving civilian populations, medical personnel, and victims without truth, access to justice, or redress.

Human Rights and Legal Implications

• Violations of International Law: The use of toxic chemicals as weapons violates Article I of the CWC and fundamental rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), directly threatening the rights to life, health, and physical safety.
• Right to the Truth: Victims and affected communities possess an absolute right to an impartial determination of facts.
• State & Individual Responsibility: Establishing responsibility requires an independent, transparent, and rigorous chain of custody and laboratory analysis to support any future legal or judicial accountability mechanisms.

Recommended Verification Pathways

To bridge the gap between accusation and denial, the report outlines clear mechanisms under the Chemical Weapons Convention:

                            VERIFICATION PATHWAYS
                                     │
         ┌───────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────┐
         ▼                           ▼                           ▼
┌─────────────────┐         ┌─────────────────┐         ┌─────────────────┐
│  Clarifications │         │    Technical    │         │    Challenge    │
│ & Consultations │         │   Assistance    │         │   Inspection    │
│   (Article IX)  │         │    Visits       │         │   (Article IX)  │
└────────┬────────┘         └────────┬────────┘         └────────┬────────┘
         │                           │                           │
         └───────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────┘
                                     ▼
                  ┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
                  │    Core Verification Standards      │
                  ├─────────────────────────────────────┤
                  │ • Secure Chain of Custody           │
                  │ • OPCW Accredited Lab Analysis      │
                  │ • Witness/Victim Protection         │
                  │ • Unrestricted Field Access         │
                  └─────────────────────────────────────┘

1. Formal CWC Mechanisms: Activation of Article IX procedures (requests for clarification, technical assistance visits, or formal requests for challenge inspections).
2. Evidence Preservation: Standardized collection and preservation of physical, environmental, and medical evidence ensuring strict chain-of-custody protocols.
3. Independent Laboratory Analysis: Submission of samples to OPCW-designated, accredited laboratories.
4. Protection Measures: Explicit safeguards against retaliation for witnesses, medical personnel, potential victims, and whistleblowers.

Conclusion

The proceedings of July 9, 2026, highlighted an escalating international dispute. Without the activation of formal, independent OPCW verification mechanisms, the Sudan chemical weapons file remains trapped between unilateral national claims and internal state denials—leaving human rights protections and victim accountability unmet.

Sources of Information

The report draws on four levels of sources:

1. Official documents of the OPCW, including the front page of the 112th session’s documents, the American statement issued under item 6(e) dated July 9, 2026, the Sudanese document EC-112/NAT.15 circulated on July 6, 2026, and Decision EC-112/DEC.7 relating to Syria, used as a prior institutional comparison.
2. Official national documents, including the American statement and the report of the Sudanese National Committee, with each treated as a position or finding issued by the entity that prepared it, not as an independent or final judgment.
3. Relevant legal and institutional references, including the Chemical Weapons Convention — particularly its provisions on compliance, verification, inspection, and declaration — alongside the rules of international humanitarian law relevant to the protection of civilians and the prohibition of chemical weapons use.
4. Published media coverage and investigations, used to trace the chronological timeline and general coverage, but not to establish technical facts or attribute responsibility independently.

Standard for Handling Information

The report adopts a distinction between three levels:

Accordingly, the report uses phrases such as “according to the American statement,” “according to the Sudanese national report,” and “no independent technical finding has been published to date,” in order to avoid conflating political positions with an independent international technical finding.

Limits of Information

The report’s findings are subject to the following limitations:

• No access was available to the alleged incident sites, samples, original medical records, or witnesses.
  • The United States has not published, within the available documents, the full technical basis for its assessment, including details of samples, laboratory results, and the chain of custody of evidence.
  • The Sudanese report does not include the results of independent laboratory analysis or detailed data allowing external verification of samples and the procedures followed.
  • No final technical report has been issued by the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW regarding Sudan within the available public documents.

• Facts or legal assessments may change in the event of the issuance of a final report by the Sudanese Committee, publication of additional technical information, or activation of one of the international investigation/verification mechanisms.

Scope of the Report

The report does not aim to establish final responsibility for any party, nor to substitute for a competent technical or judicial investigation. Its purpose is limited to:

• Documenting what occurred at the July 9, 2026 session.
  • Analyzing the documents and conflicting positions.
  • Setting out the human rights and legal implications of the allegations.
  • Identifying the gaps that prevent a conclusive finding.
  • Presenting the available verification and accountability pathways.
  • Affirming the priority of protecting civilians and the rights of potential victims to the truth, justice, and redress.

The report affirms that any final conclusion regarding the use of chemical weapons, or the determination of those responsible for it, requires an independent, rapid, impartial, and comprehensive investigation that meets the standards of field access, evidence preservation, analysis in accredited laboratories, and guaranteeing the right of all concerned parties to submit information and respond.

Background of the Allegations 

Allegations of chemical weapons use in Sudan arise in the context of the country’s ongoing armed conflict since April 2023, which has entailed extensive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and a severe deterioration in the conditions of civilians. However, the scope of this report is limited to allegations related to the use of chemical weapons during 2024, and the official positions and national and international procedures that followed, up to July 17, 2026.

The public documents issued by the OPCW do not provide complete technical details about the incidents on which the United States relied, such as the sites of alleged use or the type of substance or laboratory analysis results. Some press coverage has attributed the allegations to the use of chlorine, but the American statement submitted to the 112th session did not name the chemical substance in question. The report therefore treats this information as unpublished allegations, not established international technical findings.

Key Observations

The timeline shows that the file has passed through three parallel phases:

1. The phase of American national accusation and sanctions.
2. The phase of the Sudanese national investigation and official response.
3. The phase of debate within the OPCW without reaching an international investigation or an institutional decision regarding Sudan.

Accordingly, the case remained, up to the time of preparing this report, in a phase of contested facts, and has not yet moved to a phase of an independent international technical finding — which makes verification, impartial access to

evidence, and protection of witnesses and affected communities essential elements to prevent evasion of accountability or the instrumentalization of the file outside its human rights and legal track.

Proceedings of the July 9, 2026 Session

The 112th session of the Executive Council of the OPCW was held in The Hague from July 7 to 10, 2026. Among the documents of the session, a statement by the United States was issued on July 9 under item 6(e): “Addressing the Threat Arising from the Use of Chemical Weapons in Sudan.” This statement constitutes the main public document that addressed the Sudan file that day.

The American Statement

The United States presented to the Council what it described as findings of “independent and precise national

technical assessments,” noting that these assessments concluded that the Government of Sudan had used chemical weapons during 2024, and that it remained in a state of non-compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention during 2025.

The American statement contained five key messages:

1. Affirming the gravity of the allegations: linking the use of chemical weapons to a violation of the absolute prohibition in Article I of the Convention.
2. Refusal to consider the national investigation as a substitute for international verification: Sudan’s establishment of a national technical committee does not exempt it from its Convention obligations, nor constitute independent verification.
3. Clarifying the limits of the American role: the United States had not sent personnel to Sudan to conduct an independent investigation, and had not directed or overseen the Sudanese National Committee’s investigation.
4. A demand for specific procedures from Sudan: submission of a comprehensive and precise declaration to the Technical Secretariat on relevant facilities, materials, and chemical weapons, then permitting immediate, unrestricted, and transparent access for full field verification.
5. Linking the file to political consequences: reference to a second round of American sanctions, and a call on states parties to choose Executive Council representatives from countries in full compliance and capable of verification — not a direct legal call or decision on Council membership criteria, but an American political position.

The Sudanese Document Available Before the Session

Sudan circulated document EC-112/NAT.15 three days before the session convened, including a verbal note from the Sudanese mission attaching the initial report of the National Committee concerned with the American allegations.

According to the report, the Committee’s work included reviewing available documents and records, field visits, interviews with local officials, health sector workers, and community representatives, and taking precautionary samples. The Committee concluded that, as of the time of preparing the report, it had not identified documentary, technical, or material evidence supporting the use of chemical weapons in the facts it had examined.

However, the report affirmed at the same time that its findings were preliminary, that its work had been affected by security and logistical factors and by delay in obtaining some records and information, and that the investigation would continue toward a final report. The published report was not accompanied by an analysis issued by independent laboratories, detailed sample results, or information allowing external verification of the chain of custody.

What Did Not Happen at the Session

This point takes on particular importance in describing the legal status of the file. According to the public documents available for the 112th session:

• No decision was issued by the Executive Council establishing Sudan’s use of chemical weapons.
• No final technical report was issued by the Technical Secretariat regarding Sudan.
• No international investigation mission or field inspection task to Sudan was announced.
• No request for a challenge inspection or a similar official procedure under Article IX of the Convention appeared in the public documents.
• The Council did not take any measure restricting or suspending Sudan’s rights or privileges.
• Other states’ documents accompanying item 6(e) focused mainly on chemical materials use in Ukraine, the Navalny case, and riot-control agents in conflicts; no independent collective position, decision, or joint procedural initiative regarding Sudan appears among the available materials.

The Significance of the Session

The proceedings of July 9 confirm that the Sudan file has moved to a higher level of diplomatic pressure within the OPCW, but without yet moving to a phase of international investigation or a decisive institutional finding. The American statement placed the demand for international verification more explicitly, while circulation of the Sudanese report allowed states parties to view the national response and its preliminary findings.

This reflects that the core of the dispute was not over the importance of the international prohibition on chemical weapons, but over how to prove or refute their use, the adequacy of the national investigation, and the nature of the next international steps. From a human rights perspective, continuing this dispute within a framework of national narratives alone is not sufficient, since the right of potentially affected communities to know the truth requires the file to move to an independent verification track capable of actual access to the facts, examination of material and medical evidence, sample analysis in accredited laboratories, and guaranteeing the right of all parties to submit information and respond.

Points of Strength in the Report

Methodological Limitations and Gaps

Despite the importance of the steps taken publicly, the report does not provide sufficient details to address the requirements of an effective investigation into serious allegations regarding the use of chemical weapons.

First, the report does not sufficiently clarify the extent of the institutional and operational independence of the Committee from institutions and bodies that may be the subject of the allegations or that control relevant sites and records. A national investigation can gain greater credibility if it includes independent expertise, allows external technical oversight, and demonstrates clear guarantees against conflicts of interest.

Second, the report does not disclose the specific sites the Committee visited, the criteria for their selection, or the extent to which they match the sites or facts on which the American allegations were based. This is a significant gap,

because the absence of evidence at a particular site does not carry decisive significance unless the site, time, and scope of inspection are matched to the facts underlying the allegation.

Third, the report mentions taking “precautionary samples,” but does not indicate:

• The type of samples, their number, dates, and how they were taken.
• The entity that collected them.
• The conditions of their preservation and transport.
• Their chain of custody.
• The laboratories that analyzed them.
• The analytical methodologies used.
• The final or preliminary results of the analysis.

Without this information, it is difficult to assess the evidentiary strength of the samples or compare them against international standards adopted in chemical investigations.

Fourth, the report does not provide details on witness protection mechanisms, measures ensuring the confidentiality of interviews, or the extent to which individuals and local communities were able to provide information without fear or pressure. In conflict situations, these guarantees are an essential element in the credibility of testimonies and the integrity of the investigation.

Fifth, the report acknowledges that the security and logistical situation, and delay in accessing records and information, affected the pace of the investigation. These factors place practical limits on the significance of the negative finding; the passage of time, difficulty of access, or changes in the environment in conflict areas may reduce the possibility of finding material or environmental evidence.

Assessment of Evidence: Gaps and What Exists

The available public documents reveal a clear gap between the gravity of the allegations raised and the level of published, verifiable, independent technical evidence. The available information confirms the existence of an official American assessment, a preliminary Sudanese national investigation, and open-source media coverage and materials; however, they do not yet include an independent international technical report establishing the occurrence of use, identifying the substance used, or establishing responsibility for its use.

The human rights assessment of evidence in such issues distinguishes between five separate matters: the occurrence of the incident, identification of the specific substance, attribution of the act to a specific party, proof of use as a weapon, and determination of command or individual responsibility. Answering one of these questions alone is not sufficient to answer the others.

Available Evidence and Its Value

The Gap in Technical Evidence

The most prominent gap lies in the absence of public information about the chain of technical evidence. It is not sufficient to say that a chemical substance was found at a given site, or that witnesses reported symptoms, smells, or gas clouds; rather, the following elements must be established:

1. That the sample was collected from a site relevant to the incidents.
2. That the sample was preserved and stored according to a documented chain of custody.
3. That the analysis was conducted in a qualified, independent laboratory.
4. That the identified substance falls within the definition of the relevant toxic chemical.
5. That the substance was used with intent to harm or kill as a means of combat, not as an incidental result of industrial activity or environmental contamination.
6. That there is a documented link between the incident and the party responsible for it.

The publicly available information, to date, does not reveal the completion of this chain by either party in a manner that allows independent external verification.

The Gap in Establishing the Facts

The published documents do not contain sufficient details about the specific facts, dates, and locations that fall within the core of the American allegation. This affects the ability to assess the Sudanese investigation, since it is difficult to know whether the sites visited by the National Committee fully match the facts on which the United States relied, and whether the visits took place at a time allowing access to material or environmental traces of significance.

Moreover, the passage of time, the continuation of the conflict, changes in control over areas, population movement, and exposure of the facts to shelling, destruction, or contamination may all affect the survival of material evidence and the possibility of collecting it later. Therefore, the absence of evidence at a site inspected after a long period does not necessarily carry conclusive significance regarding the non-occurrence of the incidents.

The Gap in Medical and Humanitarian Evidence

The available documents do not publish detailed medical records, clinical or epidemiological examination results, or independently documented testimonies regarding potential cases of exposure to toxic chemical substances. This gap is significant, because medical evidence, when collected safely and methodically, can help:

• Monitor unusual health patterns.
• Compare medical testimonies with field facts.
• Identify affected groups and areas needing protection or medical intervention.
• Support or exclude hypotheses of exposure to toxic materials.

The absence of these records in the public domain does not mean they do not exist, but it prevents their assessment or reliance upon issuing a final human rights finding.

The Gap in Investigative Independence and Transparency

The independence of the investigating body and the transparency of its procedures constitute a fundamental pillar in cases that may implicate state organs or institutions. A national investigation gains greater credibility when accompanied by clear guarantees related to the independence of committee members, protection of witnesses, publication of the scope of the investigation and results, and enabling analyses to be reviewed by independent experts.

In the case at hand, the public documents do not show the existence of an independent international mechanism that reviewed the findings of the Sudanese committee, nor do they show the existence of an officially announced track for the United States to hand over its evidence to the Technical Secretariat for verification. As a result, the two parties remain presenting two conflicting narratives without a joint technical reference to adjudicate between them.

Final Assessment of the Evidence

The report concludes that the currently available public evidence does not meet the standard required to conclusively prove or refute the use of chemical weapons. The American position must be treated as a high-gravity official accusation requiring investigation, and the Sudanese report as a preliminary national finding that merits review, not as a final finding that closes the file.

Nor does the limitation of the published evidence mean that the allegations are incorrect, just as the absence of found evidence in some facts does not mean that use did not occur. The most professional conclusion is that the file still needs an independent, rapid, and comprehensive investigation that answers the following sequential questions:

 Comparative Precedents and Technical Sources

1. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Third Report on the Technical Assistance Visit to Ukraine, June 26, 2025.
2. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Second Report on the Technical Assistance Visit to Ukraine, February 14, 2025.
3. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Preventing the Re-emergence of Chemical Weapons.
4. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Accredited Laboratories.

American Sources

1. US Federal Register, Determinations Regarding Sudan’s Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Act, June 27, 2025.
2. Reuters, United States Imposes Sanctions on Sudan after Determining Use of Chemical Weapons, May 22, 2025.

 Media Sources Specific to the July 2026 Session

1. The National, “US Demands Immediate Inspections of Sudan’s Chemical Weapons and Warns of Consequences,” July 11, 2026.
2. Sky News Arabia, “Washington: The Sudanese Army Used Chemical Weapons, and We Demand an International Inspection,” July 2026.
3. Dunya Radio, “The Chemical Weapon in Sudan Returns to the Fore: Official Denial and American Pressures,” July 13, 2026.
4. Al-Ittihad (UAE), “Washington Demands the Port Sudan Authority Submit a Full Declaration on Its Chemical Program,” July 13, 2026.
5. Interfax, “United States Calls for International Inspection in Sudan,” [Russian-language], July 11, 2026.
6. The Arab Weekly, “US Escalates Pressure on Sudan Army over Chemical Weapons Allegations,” July 13, 2026.