Iran–Sudan Military Relations: From Estrangement to an Emerging Defense Partnership

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) Paper · August 2026

Region: Horn of Africa & Red Sea · Classification: OSINT / Unclassified

1. Executive Summary & Key Assessments

Available open-source information indicates that the relationship between Iran and authorities associated with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has, since the second half of 2023, moved from a phase of political and diplomatic re-engagement toward a more advanced level of cooperation with a military dimension.

Key Figures at a Glance

Cross-checked evidence indicates that the most significant manifestations of this cooperation include the Sudanese Armed Forces’ acquisition of Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicles and their use during the war, alongside air activity between Iran and Port Sudan, followed by subsequent indications that channels for negotiations and military contracting between the two sides continued.

However, open sources still do not provide sufficient evidence to establish the presence of a conventional Iranian combat deployment inside Sudan. Accordingly, this paper uses the term “Iranian military intervention” primarily to refer to military, technical, and logistical support, rather than to the presence of declared Iranian forces directly participating in operations.

Iran’s return came at a highly sensitive moment. After the Sudanese war erupted on 15 April 2023, Tehran and Khartoum began discussing the restoration of relations in July of the same year, after ties had been severed since 2016, before the two countries officially announced the resumption of diplomatic relations on 9 October 2023. The political channel reopened at a time when the SAF were facing considerable military pressure and seeking additional sources to strengthen their capabilities.

How the Evidence Converges — Four Independent Evidence Streams

Key Intelligence Assessments

Overall Assessment: As of August 2026, open-source information does not indicate an Iranian military occupation or large-scale conventional combat deployment inside Sudan. It does, however, provide strong evidence of indirect military intervention based on arms supplies, technology, and defense relations — within a broader political trajectory aimed at re-establishing Iranian influence in Sudan.

2. From Estrangement to Return: A Three-Decade Arc

Iran’s return to Sudan after the April 2023 war cannot be understood as a new relationship created solely by the SAF’s need for military support. The current rapprochement rests on a political, security, and military legacy extending over more than three decades.

Timeline of Iran–Sudan Relations

The diplomatic rupture in 2016 did not erase the institutional history of the relationship. Sudanese state institutions and individuals retained experience from dealing with Iran during the Bashir era. When Sudanese actors needed to reopen a channel after 2023, the relationship was not being built from scratch — it rested on institutional memory and previously established communication networks.

Intelligence Assessment: Iran’s return was not the result of an ideological awakening inside Sudan, but a process of restoring an old relationship under conditions created by the war. The military and security legacy of the Bashir era created an institutional foundation that facilitated rapprochement after 2023. The operational role of Islamist networks in the current cooperation requires independent analysis.

3. Nature & Operational Impact of the Intervention

Open sources support, with high confidence, describing Iran’s role in Sudan as indirect military intervention, primarily based on the transfer of military capabilities and technology to the SAF rather than the deployment of Iranian combat units.

The Three Levels of Intervention

Drone Systems: The Clearest Evidence

Iranian Drone Systems Identified in Sudan — Evidence Strength

The Air Bridge Between Iran and Port Sudan

Flight-tracking data reviewed by Reuters showed that a cargo aircraft operated by Qeshm Fars Air made six flights between Iran and Port Sudan during December 2023 and January 2024, directly before and during the period in which more advanced Iranian systems began appearing in operations.

Qeshm Fars Air Cargo Flights: Iran ⇄ Port Sudan

The existence of the flights is established to a higher degree than the contents of the shipments. Nevertheless, the combination of indicators — timing of flights, restoration of diplomatic relations shortly beforehand, the subsequent appearance of Iranian systems, and sources describing military transfers — makes the hypothesis that the flights formed part of a military supply bridge highly plausible.

From Emergency Shipments to Military Contracting

Developments in the United States during 2026 provide another indication that the relationship may have gradually evolved toward more institutional arrangements. In April 2026, the US Department of Justice announced the arrest of an Iranian national accused of facilitating military transactions with Sudan, including a contract worth more than $70 million for the sale of Mohajer-6 drones from Iran’s Ministry of Defense to Sudan’s military establishment.

These remain judicial allegations rather than facts established by a final judgment. Nevertheless, the nature and scale of the alleged transaction — if confirmed — point toward a more organized relationship than the emergency shipment of limited systems, suggesting two phases: a rapid response to the SAF’s need for UAV capabilities in late 2023/early 2024, followed by a more organized relationship with Iran’s defense-industrial sector.

4. The Former Regime & Islamist Political Networks

Political Islam represents one of the most complex elements in explaining Iran’s return — not because the current relationship can be reduced to an ideological alliance, but because the Islamist movement and Bashir-era networks were historically part of the environment in which Iranian-Sudanese relations were built.

A 2025 Reuters investigation found that networks associated with the former regime participated in mobilization and combat, with the number of fighters directly associated with the National Congress Party possibly reaching approximately 5,000.

Three Levels of the Islamist–Iran Connection

US measures increased the weight of the hypothesis that direct channels exist between some Sudanese Islamist components and Iran. In September 2025, the US Treasury linked the Al-Baraa ibn Malik Brigade to Iranian support and the Revolutionary Guard, and in March 2026 Washington designated what it described as the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood.

Are the Islamists Iran’s gateway to the army? Available evidence allows three levels to be identified: (1) longstanding historical relations — high confidence; (2) some Islamist figures retained direct relations with Iran and used them during the war — medium–high confidence; (3) that Islamists were the principal or exclusive channel for military agreements — unproven. After diplomatic relations were restored, the Sudanese military leadership could communicate directly with Iran through state institutions without requiring an Islamist intermediary.

5. What Does Iran Want from Sudan and the Red Sea?

Iran’s interest in Sudan does not appear explainable through revenues from drone and arms sales alone. Sudan occupies a strategic position on the western coast of the Red Sea, and Tehran’s return coincided with the growing importance of this maritime corridor in regional security calculations.

Iranian Interests in Sudan: Two Interconnected Levels

1. Direct & Tactical: Building a relationship with a military institution dependent on new weapons sources — expanding the network of countries using Iranian systems and consolidating Iran’s position as a supplier turned to when Western options are limited.

2. Strategic: Using the military relationship to build political and security influence exploitable after the war. Sudan’s geographic position becomes more important than its purchasing power — a long Red Sea coastline connecting Northeast Africa, the Horn, and the Arab world.

Did Iran Request a Naval Base?

In March 2024, the Wall Street Journal reportedly cited a senior Sudanese intelligence official saying Iran had sought to establish a permanent naval base on the Red Sea coast, offering advanced weapons; the Sudanese side reportedly rejected the offer. The claim was met with denials from both sides, and no final agreement or official document was publicly released.

Red Sea Naval Access — OSINT Classification

Iran may not need a “base” in the traditional sense. From an influence perspective, Iran could instead seek limited port access, recurring naval visits, maintenance arrangements, maritime security cooperation, or the presence of companies associated with port services. Such arrangements would be more politically manageable while providing many of the benefits of a formal base. Port Sudan received Iranian warships in 2012 and 2013 without this developing into a permanent base.

6. Strategic Alliance or Transaction of Interests?

The existence of evidence that the SAF receive Iranian military support does not necessarily mean that Khartoum has become a strategic ally of Tehran. A review of the army’s external relations during the war shows a more pragmatic policy based on diversifying sources of support.

SAF’s “Multiple Strategic Suppliers”

Alongside Iran, the SAF have maintained varying degrees of close relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, and have used military systems from multiple sources. This plurality can be described as a strategy of “multiple strategic suppliers” — the army does not need to choose a single axis if it can obtain different types of support from different partners.

The relationship therefore rests on a clear exchange of needs: the army needs capabilities and partners, while Iran needs access and influence. The exchange, however, is not perfectly balanced — as the army’s external options increase, Iran’s ability to convert support into political influence declines.

Constraints on Iranian Influence

1. Regional plurality: The army’s continuing relationships with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar.
2. Economic interests: Sudan’s long-term economy is tied to the Arab world, the Gulf, and international institutions — making full alignment with Iran costly.
3. Historical precedent: Khartoum abandoned a close relationship with Tehran in 2016 when its regional priorities changed.

7. Final Assessment: Information Gaps & Future Scenarios

The overall open-source evidence indicates that Iranian intervention in Sudan moved, since late 2023, from the restoration of political relations toward an actual defense relationship with observable military effects. Its most prominent manifestation has been the arrival of Iranian-origin drones, accompanied by logistical activity between Iran and Port Sudan.

Future Scenarios — Probability Assessment (Aug 2026)

Major Intelligence Gaps

Early-Warning Indicators

• New institutional defense cooperation; continuation or expansion of military contracts.
• Credible evidence of Iranian technical training or support inside Sudan.
• Regular expansion of relations between defense institutions; any maritime cooperation.
• Return of Iranian military vessels to Sudanese ports on a regular basis.
• Change in the position of Islamist forces within postwar institutions.
• Response of Saudi Arabia and Egypt — opposition or more attractive alternatives.

Final Intelligence Assessment: Iranian military intervention in Sudan is established at the level of arms supply and defense support, but it has not yet developed into Iranian military or political dominance. The decisive indicator is not the continued arrival of Iranian weapons, but the transition in the relationship from “support during the war” to “institutional dependency after the war.” If this transition occurs, it would signal a genuine strategic shift. If Khartoum maintains a diversity of partners, Iran’s return will remain significant but limited by the boundaries of the interest-based arrangement the war has produced.

References

1. Human Rights Watch (HRW). Analysis of visual and open-source information documenting Sudanese Armed Forces’ use of Iranian Mohajer-6 drones, including wreckage photographs, January 2024.
2. Reuters. Investigative reporting (2023–2025) on Iran–Sudan military cooperation, Qeshm Fars Air cargo flights between Iran and Port Sudan, drone acquisition, and Islamist networks — citing Iranian, regional, diplomatic, and military sources.
3. US Department of Justice & US Department of the Treasury. Criminal complaint (April 2026) on the arrest of an Iranian national and the alleged $70M+ Mohajer-6 drone contract; sanctions designations (September 2025) of Gibril Ibrahim and the Al-Baraa ibn Malik Brigade; designation of the “Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood” (March 2026).
4. European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). Assessment of the security situation in Sudan, reporting Iranian material support including Mohajer-6 and Ababil drones and weapons transfers via flights to Port Sudan.
5. ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data). Analysis of the drone mix used by Sudanese armed forces, including Mohajer-6 and Ababil-3, and the diversification of drone sources across geographically separated fronts.
6. United Nations human rights office (OHCHR). Warnings (May–July 2026) on the expanding use of drones in the Sudan war, reporting at least 880 civilian deaths from drone strikes between January and April 2026.

This paper is an open-source intelligence (OSINT) assessment. Allegations referenced from judicial complaints and sanctions designations remain unproven absent final judgment. Confidence levels reflect the strength of publicly available evidence, not classified intelligence.